In the Theaetetus, Plato explores through Socrates the three possibilities for the proper understanding of an ‘account’. These three ‘accounts’ include perception, true judgment, and true judgment with an account. In the end, Socrates rejects the three claims for separate reasons.Theaetetus proposes the idea that ‘knowledge is perception’ which involves sensory perception. For instance, an account of a tree involves the perception of the individual about the tree through the person’s senses. ‘Knowledge is perception’ inevitably agrees with the claim that experiences of individuals with the world or the surroundings have an important part in the development of man’s knowledge. Hence, without somebody actually sensing a certain tree consisting of branches, leaves, and its other parts there would be no ‘account’ or, more specifically, no knowledge concerning the tree.This account seems believable at first. Yet one thing appears to trouble the formation of the accounts following the suggestion of Theaetetus: what about our knowledge about certain things which we have not yet have direct experience? For instance, we may never have come across an actual whale before, yet we have the knowledge of a whale as the largest marine mammal or something like that. There are still other examples to illustrate the point. What is important is to understand that certainly not all accounts are based solely on perception. For this reason Theaetetus’ proposal is rejected.On the other hand, the idea that knowledge is true judgment has its own basis. For one, a judgment which is considered to be true is a strong claim for the knowledge for a certain object. On the other hand, a true judgment requires that the judgment be true in order for the “account” to be truly an “account”. However, there is one problem with this approach: exactly how is one to know that the judgment is true?It appears that without an authority where a judgment is to be based as true, there would hardly be any “account” in the first place. Or assuming we were already able to acquire the element which verifies a certain judgment to be true, will it lead us to true judgments for each case or all cases? Apparently, it is quite a difficult ask to determine a universal element that confirms true judgments as proper “accounts”. To begin with, there is even no conclusive element that confirms true judgments as proper “accounts”.How about true judgment with an account? In the Theaetetus, knowledge is not essentially true belief for beliefs do not differ much from mere judgments. Even if a judgment or a belief is held as true, it is not automatically the case that the true belief or judgment is knowledge. But how about true judgment with an account? Such an argument only takes one back to the central question given: which of the accounts is being referred to?It can be argued that such reasoning is more of a tautology rather than a mere clarification of the answer to the problem. By using the same term (accounts) in confirming the concept of “accounts”, the examination or discussion about the term may lead towards an infinite regress where the same term under question is tried to be resolved through the use of the same term throughout.In general, the three accounts mentioned in the Theaetetus are rejected for the reason that all three show inconsistencies at certain points. Since a healthy philosophical inquiry such as the one shown in Theaetetus requires a constant exploration of the concepts, sticking to a single, inconsistent and indefensible claim defeats the very purpose of the inquiry: to arrive at knowledge.